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There is much evidence that private sector employers categorized as 
‘‘large’’ pay more than employers categorized as “small,”  even when 
their union  status is  the same (Brown and Medoff  1986). There is, 
however, much less information that can help us answer two key ques- 
tions about this wage differential: How can larger private sector em- 
ployers pay more and still survive? Why do they do so‘? 
In this paper we move from the private sector to the public sector, 
while still focusing on the employer size-wage  differential. Published 
tabulations of Census of Governments data (US. Census Bureau  1979b) 
suggest that larger government units do pay substantially higher wages 
than smaller ones. For example, average full-time earnings are 13 per- 
cent higher for special districts with more than 100 employees than for 
districts with less than 10 workers. A similar relationship holds when 
one divides the districts according to function and for other types of 
local government.  Moreover, the  size-wage relationship  is close to 
monotonic across the size distribution. When we investigate the mag- 
nitude of  this differential more carefully  in both union and nonunion 
settings, we find size-wage effects comparable to those found in the 
private sector. After this foray, we deal with the more difficult questions 
of how the larger employers can afford to pay  more and why they 
do so. 
Charles C. Brown is professor of  economics and program director at the Institute for 
Social Research, University of Michigan, and a research associate of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. James L. Medoff is Meyer Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and 
Industry at Harvard  University,  and a  research associate of  the National  Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
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Carney, Jeannette Darling, Robert Valletta, Martin VanDenburgh, and Daniel Hamermesh. 
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One assumption made implicitly or explicitly in most discussions of 
size-wage differentials  in the private  sector is  that larger employers 
have a greater “ability to pay.” This is because employer size is thought 
to be positively related to product market power and to the actual and, 
presumably, potential rate of  return on capital. The primary problem 
with testing whether monopoly power or above average profitability 
are necessary conditions for the existence of  a size-wage differential 
is  that  product  market  power  and  profitability are two of  the  most 
difficult concepts in economics to measure. Moreover, in  the case of 
profitability we have a very serious “endogeneity”  problem, since the 
magnitude of the wage rate will most certainly be a determinant of the 
rate of  return on capital. 
Does “ability to pay”  lie behind the size-wage effect in the public 
sector? While this question has not been addressed empirically to date, 
an informed response can be based on the outcomes of two statistical 
analyses. The first would determine whether the size of  fiscs is posi- 
tively related to the affluence of their citizens. The second would assess 
whether the remuneration a community pays is related to its economic 
well-being, other things, in particular the prevailing wage, held constant. 
If ability to pay does in fact matter for the generation of  size-wage 
differentials, the detection of its role should be greatly enhanced with 
data for public units. First of all, the ability of a state or local govern- 
ment to pay a given wage can be assessed quite well with truly ex- 
ogenous variables,  such as the average family income of the area’s 
residents or the value of the property stock per resident. In addition, 
where collective bargaining occurs, arbitrators making rulings about 
public sector wage settlements generally make reference to an area’s 
ability to pay. This fact is consistent with the guidance offered in leg- 
islation concerning public sector dispute resolution. To be more precise, 
in sixteen out of the twenty-six states with laws providing for binding 
arbitration, ability to pay is mentioned in the guidelines for the arbi- 
trator.  Moreover,  managements  and  unions bargaining in  the public 
sector also appear to pay close attention to an area’s inability or ability 
to afford wage increases. 
If  ability to pay plays a key role in the size-wage effect story, we 
should certainly be able to view its performance in the unionized por- 
tion of the public sector. If this import is not conditional on the presence 
of collective bargaining, we should be able to observe it with data for 
public units where there is no union coverage. If ability to pay is closely 
associated with the magnitude of the size-wage differential among non- 
union public employees, one would have good reason for believing that 
it operated in a similar fashion throughout the private economy. 
Section 7.1 of this study presents evidence supporting the belief that 
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cially among public sector employees covered by collective bargaining. 
Section 7.2  presents econometric results based on two data files which 
indicate that there is a sizeable positive relationship between employer 
size and pay in the public sector, as was the case among private em- 
ployers. Section 7.3  first asks whether the size of public employers is 
positively related to their ability to pay and then, in light of  an affir- 
mative response, asks about the importance of this relationship in the 
generation of the one between size and pay.2 
Our primary findings concerning the relationships between employer 
size, pay, and the ability to pay in the public sector are as follows: 
1. Larger public employers pay substantially more for workers with 
given characteristics than do those who are smaller, regardless of 
whether the workers are covered by  collective bargaining. 
2. Larger public employers are found in areas where family income 
and the value of  property are above average. 
3. The ability of an area to pay higher wages, as measured by mean 
family income or property value per resident, is a key determinant 
of whether the area does in fact pay more. 
4. Measured ability to pay “explains”  only about 15 percent of the 
public sector size-wage effect. 
5. Controlling for employer size and measured ability to pay usually 
reduces the measured impact  of  collective  bargaining on wage 
rates, but the changes are uniformly less than 20 percent of the 
union effect before these controls are added. 
7.1  Ability to Pay and Wage Determination 
The belief that the ability of an employer to pay higher wages will 
condition whether or not it does so can be  supported by  examining 
several sources: the writings of knowledgeable observers of  the wage 
determination process, the decisions of arbitrators in arbitrations con- 
cerning wages,  and the language of  state statutes providing for the 
resolution of  wage disputes involving public sector employees. 
Those who closely watch wages being set in the U.S. public sector 
list an employer’s ability to pay  as a relevant criterion for the final 
settlements observed. However, while these scholars and practitioners 
believe that ability to pay matters, they do not regard it as the primary 
criterion in the wage determination process. 
Only a small percentage of wage settlements throughout the U.S. 
economy involve arbitration. While the percentage is larger in the pub- 
lic sector, even here interest arbitration is the exception not the rule. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the wage-setting criteria cho- 
sen by  arbitrators and the weight given to each, since this choice and 
weighting are likely to reflect what happens in the absence of an arbitrator. 198  Charles C. BrowdJames L. Medoff 
In  his  1982  address  to  the  National  Academy  of  Arbitrators, 
Substantially  all  the public-sector  interest arbitration  statutes re- 
quire-either explicitly or implicitly-that  financial limitations on a 
public employer’s ability to pay must be considered by the interest 
arbitrator. That was the specific holding of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in  “New Jersey State Policemen’s  Benevolent  Association 
Local 29 vs. Town of Irvington.”  The court ruled  that an interest 
arbitrator must “take account of a municipality’s cap law constraints 
prior to the rendition  of an award.”  Nevertheless,  I  get the very 
definite impression that many interest arbitrators wish that ability- 
to-pay arguments would simply disappear. Russell Smith at the 1971 
meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, after commenting 
on the serious problems confronting arbitrators in attempting to as- 
sess an inability-to-pay argument, candidly observed that the inability- 
to-pay criterion, “if deemed to be relevant or required by law to be 
taken into consideration, is  likely to be taken less seriously  than 
others, such as comparison data.”  My own impression is that the 
attitude of many arbitrators toward the inability-to-pay criterion ranges 
from indifference to hostility.  I also have the feeling in some cases 
that while  a public  employer’s  ability  to pay  is  considered, it  is 
considered in form only and not in substance (Clark 1982, 249-50). 
The lawyer Charles C. Mulcahy (1976, 92) adds that while the finan- 
cial ability of a government  to  meet a new wage bill is generally accepted 
as a legitimate factor in making an arbitration award, it too “has been 
sorely neglected in many instances because local government officials 
did not adequately and professionally  present”  evidence concerning 
their ability or inability to meet certain wage demands. 
An examination of these statutes brings into focus the criteria that 
most arbitrators consider in ruling in wage arbitrations. In the prepon- 
derance of the laws explicit reference is made to an employer’s ability 
to pay. However, the list of relevant criteria is generally not short. A 
sense of what the typical list looks like can be gained by considering 
the following one from the Illinois statute: 
R. Theodore Clark, Jr. said: 
1. The lawful authority of the employer. 
2. Stipulations of the parties. 
3. The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability 
of the unit of government to meet those costs. 
4. Comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment 
of the employees involved  in the arbitration  proceedings  with the 
wages, hours, and  conditions of  employment  of  other employees 
performing similar services and with other employees generally: 
a. in public employment in comparable communities; 
b.  in private employment in comparable communities. 199  Employer Size, Pay, and the Ability to Pay 
5. The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly 
known as the cost of living. 
6. The overall compensation presently received by the employees, 
including direct wage compensation, vacation, holidays, and other 
excused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization 
benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other 
benefits received. 
7. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pen- 
dency of the arbitration proceedings. 
8. Such other factors, not  confined to the foregoing, which are 
normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determina- 
tion of  wages,  hours,  and conditions of  employment through vol- 
untary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or 
otherwise between  the parties, in the public service or in  private 
employment (Mulcahy 1976, 91 -92). 
While most arbitrators will have considered the ability or inability 
of  employers to pay, the weight attached to this criterion is likely to 
vary significantly. The nature of this variation was delineated clearly 
in a 1948 arbitration involving the Twin City Rapid Transit Company 
by the board’s chairman John T. Dunlop, who wrote: 
(1) In the case of properties which have been highly profitable over 
a period of years, the wage rate would normally be increased slightly 
over the levels indicated by  other standards; (2) in the case of per- 
sistently unprofitable firms, the wage rate would normally be reduced 
slightly from the levels indicated by other standards; (3) in the case 
of the companies whose financial record over a period of years falls 
between these extremes, the wage rate level would be determined 
largely by other standards (Elkouri and Elkouri  1985, 826). 
In sum, the opinions of arbitrators and the language of  statutes re- 
ferring to dispute resolution in the public sector both lend credence to 
the position that in wage determination ability to pay matters, but it is 
certainly not all that matters. Similar institutional evidence is not avail- 
able for public sector workers not covered by  collective bargaining. 
Despite this gap, we believe the importance of  ability to pay in  the 
public sector needs to be assessed empirically for three reasons. First, 
according to the Current Population Survey data we analyze below, 
the percentage of state and local employees covered by collective bar- 
gaining is quite high: 48 percent of  those labeled “white collar” and 
44 percent of those labeled “blue collar” or “service”.  Second, much 
of  what we observe under collective bargaining differs only in degree 
from what  happens in nonunion settings; while the codification em- 
bodied in a collective agreement and a formal agent clearly matter, it 
is  wrong to believe that most groups of employees that are not rep- 200  Charles C. BrowdJames L. Medoff 
resented by a union are not organized in other ways. And finally, the 
belief that the ability-to-pay criterion is more important in the presence 
of collective bargaining is testable. As we will see later, the importance 
of this criterion seems to be as great among employees who are not 
covered by a collective agreement as among those who are, at least in 
the public sector. 
7.2  The Public Employer Sizewage Effect 
This section provides evidence of the relationship between employer 
size and pay in the public sector. Employer size can mean either the 
number of workers employed at the individual’s worksite or  the number 
employed by the individual’s  employer at all  worksites. For private 
sector workers, these are usually  called “establishment”  and  “com- 
pany” size. For government employees, the second concept is less well 
defined; dictated largely by data availability, we define it to equal the 
total employment of a governmental  unit and refer to it as “government 
size .’ ’ 
7.2.1 
The only data files containing both  size measures for government 
employees3  are the May 1979  and May 1983  Current Population Surveys 
(CPS). We pooled these two files. Our analysis is based on the sample 
of 5,723 state and local government workers for whom data on wage 
rates and the other variables we use were available. 
We  estimated wage equations with the usual explanatory variables: 
education, tenure, experience, race, sex, location, and industry and 
occupation dummy variables. We also used a dummy variable to dis- 
tinguish 1979 from 1983 observations and state from local government 
workers. Finally, we analyzed  the variables of  interest: employment 
at worksite, employment of the government unit, and coverage by a 
union or employee association contract. Our results  are reported in 
table 7.1. 
The first four lines of  table 7.1 suggest two c~nclusions.~  First, both 
worksite  employment  and  government  employment  matter:  those 
working for larger employers by  either measure earn higher  wages. 
Second, the estimated impact of collective bargaining coverage is re- 
duced, but not dramatically, when we control for employer size. 
When the sample is split by collar color and unionization, the main 
finding is that government size matters a great deal for covered blue- 
collar workers but not at all for uncovered blue-collar workers. Given 
the nontrivial standard errors for subgroup size effects, the similarity 
of  the site-size premia are striking. 
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Table 7.1  Effects of Employer Size and Union Coverage on In(Wage), State and 
Local Government Workers, Current Population Survey, 1979 
and 1983 
In(Government 
Sample  In(Site Employment)  Employment)  Covered 
Union White-collar Workers 
(N =  1,956) 
Union Blue-collar Workers 
(N = 749) 
Nonunion Blue-collar Workers 
(N = 941) 
All Workers  - 













Nonunion White-collar Workers  0.016 

















































Note: Other variables held constant in the estimation are:  education, tenure, tenure squared, 
experience, experience  squared; dummy variables for race,  sex, metropolitan location, 
region (3). industry (27), occupation (8). local government, and year. 202  Charles C. BrowdJames L. Medoff 
It is natural to compare these findings to those we obtained for the 
private sector (Brown and Medoff 1986). Table 7.2, which is based on 
May  1979 CPS  private  sector workers, provides  a  basis for such a 
c~mparison.~ 
While union coverage matters less in the public sector than in the 
private sector, the employer size effects are, in the aggregate, broadly 
similar. This is particularly  evident when one focuses on the sum of 
site and company coefficients-the  effect of making the company (or 
government) larger by expanding  each worksite. The effect of employer 
size on the wages of white-collar workers is very  similar to the all- 
worker results. Among blue-collar workers a different pattern appears. 
In the public sector, the impact of employer size is greater among union 
than among nonunion workers, while in the private sector the reverse 
is true. However, one probably should not make too much of this last 
Table 7.2  Effects of Employer Size and Union Coverage on  In(Wage), 
Private Sector Workers, Current Population Survey, 1979 
Sample 
In(Site  In(Company 
Employment)  Employment)  Covered 
All Workers 
(N =  13,829) 
White-collar Workers 
(N = 6,901) 
Union Blue-Collar Workers 
(N = 2,337) 
Nonunion Blue-Collar Workers 























































Nore: Other variables held constant in the estimation are: same as table 7. I,  except for 
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result, since the pattern for private sector workers shown in table 7.2 
is not always confirmed in other data sets (Brown and Medoff 1986). 
7.2.2  Evidence from the Census of Governments 
The CPS has the advantage of  reporting number of  workers at the 
individual’s worksite and the individual’s schooling, and so forth. As 
is typical  of  surveys of  individuals,  there is little information about 
their employer apart from the size variables, and the fact that these 
are coded as categories is undesirable. The Census of Governments 
file, in  contrast, has no information about the characteristics  of  the 
workers (apart from the functional category they  work in) but does 
have  accurate measures of  government size and  better information 
about labor relations characteristics. It also identifies the governments 
involved, a fact essential to (eventually) measuring ability to pay. 
We  began with 82,973 governments included in the  1982 Census of 
Governments file. After deleting those with data reported for a year 
prior to  1982 and any zero-employment  “governments,”  the sample 
size fell to 3 1 ,267.6 
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the average wage, defined 
as monthly payroll divided by full-time plus half of part-time employ- 
ment. We  control for the proportion of workers who are part-time, so 
errors in estimating the appropriate average weight to part-time workers 
in computing full-time equivalent employment should be dealt with by 
that variable. We  also control for the shares of  employment devoted 
to each of twenty-nine governmental functions and for region and met- 
ropolitan or nonmetropolitan location. 
The explanatory variables of primary interest are government size 
and the labor relations variables. Our size measure is the logarithm of 
the number of  individuals employed by the government in question.’ 
The Census of  Governments file includes several labor relations vari- 
ables; our strategy is to try the various alternatives in a fairly agnostic 
way. The first set of labor relations variables are dummy variables that 
capture the type of labor relations policy, if  any, of the government in 
question. One dummy variable distinguishes governments that have a 
labor relations policy from those that do not. As defined in the Census 
of  Governments file, there are two types of  policy: a collective bar- 
gaining policy  or a  meet  and  confer policy.* We  include  additional 
dummy variables for each of these. It is possible for a government to 
have both types of policies, so the first dummy is not the exact sum 
of the other two. Second, three alternative measures of the degree of 
organization are available: the proportion of workers covered by con- 
tracts, in bargaining units, and unionized. 204  Charles C. BrowdJames L. Medoff 
Each of  these labor relations  variables  is  reported separately for 
school and nonschool employers: we have aggregated them. Thus, for 
example, a government that has a “bargaining policy”  for its school 
employees only would  have a value  equal  to the ratio of  (full-time 
equivalent) school to total employment. 
Our results are presented in the first six regressions in table 7.3. The 
main finding here is a large and statistically significant effect of gov- 
ernment size on wages,  controlling for differences  among different- 
sized governments in the distribution of employment across functions. 
To get a sense of the importance of the 0.039 coefficient for ln(government 
size), we calculated the difference in wages by governments one stan- 
dard deviation above and below the mean of In(government size). Since 
that standard deviation is I .83, the implied proportional wage difference 
is 2(1.83)(0.039) = 0.125. The size premium does not depend on which 
measure of  worker organization  we  utilize.  Controlling for size has 
little effect on the coefficients of  the labor relations dummies or the 
proportions organized. 
The coefficients of the collective bargaining variables  suggest that 
each of the labor-management policies are associated with higher wages 
compared to the no-policy alternative. According to the first line of 
table 7.3, a meet and confer policy raises ln(wage) by 0.12 (= 0.125 - 
0.005), a collective bargaining policy by 0.17 (= 0.125 + 0.047), and 
a combination of  policies by  about  the  same amount.  This general 
pattern holds for the other specifications as well. The major puzzle is 
the lack of the expected positive coefficient for the degree of unioniza- 
tion variable. 
We  also estimate similar equations with the logarithm of  monthly 
wages plus fringes as a dependent variable. Perhaps because of incom- 
plete  reporting  on the tape  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  1985,  IS),  these 
fringes amounted to only about 7 percent of payroll, and their inclusion 
in the wage measure did not qualitatively change our earlier findings. 
Disaggregation by collar color as in tables 7.1 and 7.2 is not possible 
with the Census of Governments data, and the contract coverage data 
refer  to  the  proportion  of  the government’s workers  covered  by  a 
contract rather than an individual worker’s status. We divided the sam- 
ple by proportion covered, with the groups being none, a minority, and 
a majority. The size coefficient is essentially  the  same for all  three 
groups.  Unlike table 7.1,  size matters  here  regardless of  coverage, 
though, if anything, the impact rises with coverage. 
The labor relations coefficients now tell a generally plausible if com- 
plicated story. Even for governments with no union contracts, having 
a labor relations policy-especially  a collective bargaining policy-is 
associated with higher wages.9 For governments with some workers Table 7.3  Effects of  Employer Size and Union Coverage on In(Wage), Census of  Governments (1982) 
Dummy Variables for:  Proportion of Workers: 
In(Government  Labor Relations  Collective  Meet &  Covered by  In Barg. 
Sample  Size)  Policy  Bargaining  Confer  Contracts  Units  Organized 
All Local  - 
Governments  - 
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(0.001) Table 7.3  (continued) 
Dummy Variables for:  Proportion of Workers: 
In(Government  Labor Relations  Collective  Meet &  Covered by  In Barg. 
Units  Organized  COntrdCtS  Sample  Size)  Policy  Bargaining  Confer 
Local 
Governments 
with 0 < Cov. < SO 
(N = 3,844) 
Local 
Governments 
with Cov. 2 0.50 
















-0.134  -0.01  1 
(0.037)  (0.006) 
-0.128  -0.013 
(0.036)  (0.006) 
0.013  0.002 
(0.049)  (0.004) 
-0.045  0.002 









Note: Other variables held constant in the estimation are: shares of  employment devoted to individual functions (29), proportion of 
workers who are part-time; dummy varables for region (3) and SMSA. 207  Employer Size, Pay, and the Ability to Pay 
covered, the extent of coverage matters, though at a decreasing rate, 
as might be expected if initial contract inroads had spillover effects. 
7.3  The Role of Ability to Pay 
Because the governments in  the Census of  Governments file  are 
separately identified, we can match data on the characteristics of those 
who live in that government’s jurisdiction  or in the surrounding area 
from the 1980 Census of Population.  Unfortunately, this proved pos- 
sible only for 4,775 larger governments (counties, municipalities, and 
townships) for whom matching Census of Population data were available. 
The equations in the first two lines of table 7.4 are the same as those 
in table 7.3, except for the smaller sample. The size effect is unaffected. 
The collective bargaining  policy  dummy is no longer important, but 
the proportion covered by  contracts now  has the expected positive 
effect. Using the proportion in bargaining units or the proportion who 
are members of employer organizations as the union coverage variable 
produced quite similar results. 
The main result in table 7.4 is contained in lines 3 and 4. The two 
control variables, which appear for the first time at this point, are the 
logarithm of the average wage in the county (defined as  aggregate house- 
hold wage and salary and self-employment earnings divided by aggre- 
gate weeks worked) and the logarithm of median family income in the 
jurisdiction.  The former is intended to capture the effect of variations 
in  wage rates in the government’s local labor market, and the latter 
the wealth or “ability  to pay” of its residents. The message of lines 3 
and 4 is simple and clear: controlling for ability to pay explains little 
(12 percent) of the wage premium paid by larger local governments and 
marginally increases the estimated union premium. 
The estimated coefficients of the In(average wage) variable are im- 
plausibly small. One might expect a coefficient near one, if  local gov- 
ernments pay a fixed proportional markup (or markdown) on wages in 
their area. Constraining the coefficient of In(average wage) to equal 
one left the government size variable virtually unaffected but reduced 
the coefficient of In(median income) to  -0.416(s.e.  = 0.013). Thus, 
the constrained results might lead one to question the importance of 
ability to pay or to interpret our average wage measure as capturing 
both the going wage and ability to pay. But the conclusion that size 
matters remains secure. We have not emphasized these “constrained” 
results because the constraint is so severe-it  is hard to imagine mea- 
surement error in In(average wage) severe enough to produce an un- 
constrained coefficient estimate of 0.03 when  the true coefficient  is 
close to 1.0. Table 7.4  Effects of  Employer Sue, Unionization,  and Ability to Pay on ln(Wages), Census of  Government, Large-Unit Subsample, 
1982 
Dummy Variables for: 
Labor Relations  Collective  Meet & 
Sample  In(Govt. Size)  Policy  Bargaining  Confer 
All “Large”  -  0.104  -0.001  0.002 
Local Governments  -  (0  .O 13)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
(N = 4,775)  0.040  0.096  -0.004  0.002 
(0.003)  (0.012)  (0.01  1)  (0.007) 
-  0. I07  -0.012  0.005 
-  (0.012)  (0.01  I)  (0.007) 
0.035  0.100  -0.014  0.004 
(0.003)  (0.01 1)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
“Large”  Local 
Governments 
with Cov. = 0 
(N = 2,950) 
“Large”  Local 
Governments 
with 0 < Cov. < 
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Note: Other variables held constant: see table 7.3. 209  Employer Size, Pay, and the Ability to Pay 
We  also used the matched government-population file to test another 
conjecture-that  the wage premium paid by larger local governments 
is because they  are large relative  to their labor market.  Adding the 
logarithm of the ratio of government employment to county population 
produced a significant negative coefficient ( -  0.032) for the added vari- 
able (and a coefficient of  0.055 for the government size variable), so 
the large-demand model does not explain the  size-wage effect.  This 
result  implies,  however,  that  if  we  enter  ln(government  size) and 
In(county population) separately, the coefficient of the former falls to 
The remainder  of  table 7.4 separates the  sample into three parts, 
where the proportion of the work force covered by collective bargaining 
is zero, between zero and one-half, or greater than or equal to one- 
half. These results indicate  that the importance  of  ability to pay  in 
explaining either cross-unit wage  rates  or the cross-unit,  size-wage 
effect does not increase with the extent of collective bargaining cov- 
erage. In fact, ability to pay is of  somewhat greater importance in the 
units with no collective bargaining than in the units with the most in 
terms of both its direct effect on wages and its capacity to explain the 
size-wage effect. As in the earlier tables, size effects are also larger in 
organized jurisdictions. 
While median family income is a widely used measure of  the eco- 
nomic status of a jurisdiction's residents, it neglects the taxable wealth 
represented by commercial enterprises in the jurisdiction. For a smaller 
sample of jurisdictions, property values (which count residential and 
nonresidential wealth) can be used to fill this gap. 
The Census of Governments collects assessed property values from 
over  13,500 assessing  units.  Unfortunately, the  ratio of  assessed to 
market value is known to vary widely across jurisdictions.  However, 
the census collected the assessed and market values of 55,300 property 
sales in a sample of jurisdictions, from which estimates of the market 
value of  all  locally assessed  property  by jurisdiction  are calculated 
(U.S.  Census Bureau  1984, 118-22). 
By matching jurisdictions where that data on property values attained 
census standards for publication to those with Census of Population 
data on family income and average wages (and the Census of Govern- 
ment data on payroll, employment, and labor relations) we arrived at 
a final sample of 669 observations. We  then added In(market value of 
property per capita) to the equations in table 7.4. Results are presented 
in table 7.5.  Comparison of the first two equations of  table 7.5 with 
analogous table 7.4 entries shows that, in this smaller sample, both 
government size and the proportion organized have larger coefficients 
than in the larger (table 7.4) sample. The last three equations in table 
7.5 demonstrate that neither of these coefficients is greatly affected by 
0.055 - 0.032 = 0.023.'' Table 7.5  Effects of Employer Size, Unionization, and Ability to Pay on In(Wages), Census of  Government, 
Large-Unit Subsample with Property Value Data (N = 669) 
Dummy Variables for: 
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adding family income and property value as controls. While there is 
evidence that both ability-to-pay measures affect wages, both are loosely 
enough  related  to government  size that  their  inclusion  reduces  the 
estimated size effect by  at most one-sixth  of its original value.  The 
impact of the proportion organized is even less sensitive to the inclusion 
of  the ability-to-pay variables. 
7.4  Conclusion 
Larger public employers pay substantially more for a given quality 
of  labor than do public employers who are smaller, even when their 
collective bargaining status is the same. Despite the fact that ability to 
pay  is positively related  to wage rates in  the public sector and that 
larger fiscs are richer, financial capacity can explain very little of the 
public employer size-wage  differential. 
Thus, ability to pay plays a very small role in explaining the fact that 
larger employers pay more in the sector where we would expect this 
role to be the largest. As a result, we must turn to other actors in trying 
to explain why size-wage differentials exist and how they can persist. 
Notes 
1. The published tabulations measure size by jurisdiction population rather 
than number of employees for counties, municipalities, and townships, and by 
enrollment for school districts. 
2. We sampled the public sector wage studies surveyed by Freeman (1986). 
Size of government receives surprisingly little attention in these studies. Often 
it is not included; sometimes it is included as a “control”  whose coefficient is 
not reported. In any case, the minority of studies that include both size and 
ability to pay as wage determinants (e.g., Frey 1975; Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, 
and Ehrenberg 1986) do not report size coefficients with and without ability 
to pay variables, as would be needed to judge whether ability to pay was an 
important part of the size-wage relationship. 
3. Our “government employment” variable is based on a CPS question for 
which interviewers received the following instruction: “The employer of Fed- 
eral, State, and local government employees . . . is  the highesr  appropriate 
governmental level. For example, ifa  person works for the county circuit court, 
the employer is the county government, not the circuit court.”  (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1983, 7) Our “site employment” is employment at “the person’s work- 
site, the place where the person performs hidher major activities or duties.” 
The CPS reports both size variables as categories (1-24,  25-99,  100-499, 
500-999,  and  1,000 or more).  Our continuous size  measures use category 
means. For local government workers, we measure “government size” as the 
average level of full-time equivalent employment in the reported size class in 
the individual’s  state, using  1977 Census of Government tabulations  (US. 212  Charles C. BrowdJames L. Medoff 
Census Bureau 1979a, 428-35).  For state government workers, “government 
size”  is the number of full-time equivalent  workers employed by  the state 
(U.S. Census Bureau  1978c, 317). Our “site size”  variable is  defined as the 
average level of employment of establishments in the individual’s site-class, 
using County Business Patterns data (U.S. Census Bureau  1978a, 3). These 
data relate to private  sector establishments, but we know of  no comparable 
series for public sector workers. 
4. We obtained similar results with the subsample of 4,008 local government 
workers. 
5. Because so few private  sector white-collar workers are unionized (less 
than 11 percent in our CPS file), we did not separate white-collar workers by 
union status. 
6. The proportions of cases deleted by type of government were: counties, 
18 percent; municipalities, 62 percent; townships, 73 percent; special districts, 
81 percent; school districts, 23 percent. Zero employment accounted for most 
of the special-district deletions, while noncurrent data accounted for the ma- 
jority of  deletions for other government types. We  decided  not to use the 
noncurrent data because the labor relations variables were current values, and 
because we know of no a priori reason to expect nonreporting to be correlated 
with the error term in the equation that determines the wage rate. 
7.  “Government”  is defined as an “organization  which, in addition to gov- 
ernmental character, has sufficient discretion  in  the management  of  its own 
affairs to distinguish it as separate from the administrative  structure of any 
other governmental  unit”  (U.S.  Census Bureau  1978b,  14).  In  addition  to 
counties, municipalities, and townships, school districts and special districts 
are counted as separate governments if they are sufficiently independent. Only 
8 percent of all school systems (with 19 percent of all public school enrollment) 
are classified as separate, independent school districts rather than part of a 
larger government. Independent “special districts,” often organized for single 
functions, accounted for 26,000 of the 80,000 local governments in  1977. For 
example, the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority  and the Boston Housing 
Authority are separate governments, but the Boston School Committee is not. 
8. Collective bargaining refers to “negotiations  in which both management 
and employee representatives are equal legal parties in the bargaining process 
and . . .  the end result. . .  is a mutually binding contractual agreement.”  “Meet 
and confer discussions” refers to “the process by which the public employer 
consents to discuss conditions of employment with representatives of an em- 
ployee organization. . . .  The employer is, however, not legally bound to enter 
into these discussions, nor to abide by any resulting memorandum of under- 
standing”  (U.S. Census Bureau 1979b, 2). 
9. For governments with some workers covered, the various types of labor 
relations policies have small estimated effects;  the exception is meet and confer 
policies  when a minority of  workers are covered, where the effect is 0.16 
(= 0.172 -  0.013) when size is included. At first, a government with workers 
covered by collective bargaining would seem to  necessarily have labor relations 
policy (indeed, a collective bargaining policy). But recall that these “dummies” 
are in fact weighted averages of separated dummies for education and other 
workers. Thus, if the teachers are covered but other workers are not, the labor 
relations and collective bargaining “dummies”  take on fractional values. 
10. We also considered the possibility that it is the population of the juris- 
diction rather than its number of employees per se which influences wages. 
When the logarithm of jurisdiction population was added as an additional con- 213  Employer Size, Pay, and the Ability to Pay 
trol  variable to the second equation in  table  7.4,  it  was significant (with a 
coefficient  of  0.021)  and  the  size  of  government  coefficient  fell  to 
0.022(s.e.  = 0.005). However, when jurisdiction population was added to the 
fourth equation in table 7.4 (i.e., county population and median income held 
constant), its coefficient was a statistically insignificant 0.006, the government 
employment coefficient was 0.030 (s.e. = O.OOS),  and the remaining coeffi- 
cients were not appreciably affected by its inclusion. 
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Comment  Daniel S. Hamermesh 
Brown and Medoff have replicated  their work  on the private  sector 
and have demonstrated that larger employers (in the public sector) pay 
higher wages to observationally identical workers. It is quite doubtful 
that  measuring  compensation more  broadly  would  affect  the result 
appreciably or that adding any additional, imaginable, obtainable con- 
trol  variables would  overturn the finding.  Nonetheless, a number of 
extensions seem worthwhile. 
First among these is an examination of whether larger jurisdictions 
offer greater promotion  opportunities and more jurisdiction-specific 
training.  One might expect this to occur and, if  it does, to affect the 
measured size-lifetime  earnings relationship.  To  circumvent this po- 
tential problem by following workers over time, the authors, or other 
interested researchers, should obtain longitudinal data on workers and 
their characteristics that can be linked to data on the governments for 
which they  work. Such data are not  readily  available  in  the United 
States, but foreign alternatives may be useful for this purpose. Data 
on job changers could also be used, as in Krueger (chap. 8, this vol- 
ume), to analyze whether unmeasured individual characteristics are 
producing a spurious size-wage effect. 
There is a general belief that government employment became less 
secure in the 1970s than it had been previously. Layoffs of government 
workers, due in some cases to reductions in demand (e.g., because of 
declines in the size of the school-age population) and in others to union- 
imposed wage increases that move governments up the demand sched- 
ule, increased the risk ofjob  loss in the public sector relative to private 
employment. If markets work at all, this should have reduced the com- 
pensating wage differential for such risk between the private and public 
sectors. More important for our purposes, if the risk of layoff increased 
especially in larger jurisdictions, it could account for part of the size- 
wage differential in public employment in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
It is not easy to discover the importance of this potential cause of the 
differential; at the least, though, one could examine whether the risk 
of job losses in public employment is greater in larger jurisdictions or 
at larger sites. 
While Brown and Medoff make some effort to account for differences 
in occupation in the estimates using the CPS samples, the occupations 
are defined  very  broadly.  If  there is  a  compensating differential  for 
positions of responsibility,  the average differential  will  be greater in 
Daniel S. Hamermesh is professor and chairperson at the Department of  Economics, 
Michigan State University, and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic 
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larger jurisdictions and at larger sites. Thus part of the size-wage re- 
lationship may be accounted for by a failure to hold constant satisfac- 
torily for occupational level. This possibility could be easily examined 
if the authors were to use readily available data on salaries in a narrowly 
defined occupation, for example, classroom teachers or bus drivers, 
and relate them to site or jurisdiction size. 
All of these extensions are worth pursuing and should be pursued. 
I doubt, though, that they will obliterate  the size-wage effect the authors 
have found. We  should accept their  findings  in  both the public  and 
private sectors as “true facts,” though relatively unsurprising  ones, 
and endeavor to explain why they arise. In the context of the private 
sector, this means rationalizing the simultaneous existence of firms in 
the same market having different labor costs; in the public  sector it 
requires the more difficult task of explaining why voters in larger ju- 
risdictions want higher-paid public servants, or, alternatively, why tax- 
payers remain in those  jurisdictions. Such rationalization requires more 
than the careful presentation of data that constitutes this study. 
The authors show that union coverage has less effect on wage dif- 
ferentials than do public policies that encourage bargaining. This result 
suggests that the major cause of higher  wages under collective  bar- 
gaining is not union coverage but rather public leniency toward work- 
ers’  exercising  their  rights  collectively.  This  accords  with  the 
conservative view that unionism expanded in the United States in the 
1930s mainly because of encourgement provided by federal policy.  It 
indicates, though it by no means proves, that union successes depend 
crucially more on their political clout than on their ability to attract 
members or to extract rents from firms. It is not a very happy conclusion 
for those who see public attitudes, and their reflection in public policy, 
as becoming increasingly negative toward unionism. This Page Intentionally Left Blank